Supplementary material

1 Industry presence not related to all roll calls

We demonstrate that our primary variable of interest, the presence of auto workers in the member's district, is not systematically related to the entire set of roll calls. Of the 2852 roll call votes in the 110th Congress and the first session of the 111th, we consider the 2233 roll calls that are not unanimous or a perfect party vote. We regress members' votes on industry presence, the first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score, and campaign contributions by the Big Three and AFL-CIO.

Figure 1 displays the density of these values. We omit extremely large coefficients that result from the computational difficulty of estimating coefficients in very near-party votes (such as those with only one partisan defector). The coefficients on industry district are symmetric around zero, unimodal, and usually smaller than the values we obtain for the auto bailout and the trade-in program. If we saw industry presence predicting votes unrelated to the auto industry in a *systematic* way, we might suspect that industry presence is a proxy for some other political quantity or that workers had pervasive influence; however, industry presence appears unrelated to votes over the entire set of roll calls.

Industry presence is positively associated with votes for the bailout and cash for clunkers, and these relationships are substantial relative to the absolute value of the industry district coefficients overall. Considering all non-perfect-party votes, the bailout vote is larger than about 69% of the absolute coefficients, and the trade-in vote is larger than about 45% of the absolute coefficients. When we introduce stricter thresholds for the votes, our two industry coefficients look relatively even larger. For example, excluding votes with only a single partisan defector, the absolute bailout vote is in the 76th percentile, and the clunkers vote is in the 49th percentile. If we focus on the competitive roll calls by employing lopsidedness thresholds (Snyder and Groseclose 2000), the pattern remains unchanged.[1]

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[1] The fraction of absolute industry presence coefficients smaller than the bailout and trade-in ones is 76% and 49% for the votes where the winning side carried no more than 90%; 74% and 46% when the winners carried no more than 80%, and 70% on the bailout when the winners carried no more than 70%.

Figure S1 Coefficients on industry presence, all 2233 non-unanimous, non-perfect-party roll calls, 110th Congress and first session of 111th.

2 Supplementary Tables

2.1 Logistic regression coefficient estimates, bills on which industry expresses an opinion

Table S1 Logistic regression coefficients of support for House Roll Call 40, congressional session 110.1. HR6: Creating Long-term Energy Alternatives for the Nation Act.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.93***	2.76***	3.23***	2.97***
	(0.51)	(0.57)	(0.55)	(0.74)
≥1000 Auto workers	0.30	0.62	0.47	0.92*
	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.46)
Republican	−5.50***		−4.84***	
	(0.54)		(0.55)	
DW-NOMINATE		−8.45***		−8.36***
		(1.14)		(1.31)
Ford/Chrysler/GM PAC Contribs (log)			−0.08	−0.10†
			(0.05)	(0.05)
AFL-CIO PAC Contribs (log)			0.17***	0.02
			(0.05)	(0.06)
N	416	416	416	416
AIC	229.57	166.29	221.41	167.02
BIC	277.93	214.66	302.03	247.63
log L	−102.78	−71.15	−90.71	−63.51

Standard errors in parentheses.
†Significant at $p<0.10$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.
Table created with R package apsrtable.

Table S2 Logistic regression coefficients of support for House Roll Call 1057, congressional session 110.1. HR 3685: Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	2.00***	0.66***	1.49***	0.50†
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.31)	(0.27)
≥1000 Auto workers	0.20	0.25	0.24	0.31
	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.33)
Republican	−3.58***		−3.10***	
	(0.29)		(0.33)	
DW-NOMINATE		−4.15***		−3.83***
		(0.34)		(0.40)
Ford/Chrysler/GM PAC Contribs (log)			−0.03	−0.03
			(0.04)	(0.04)
AFL-CIO PAC Contribs (log)			0.10*	0.05
			(0.04)	(0.04)
N	413	413	413	413
AIC	343.75	312.19	341.25	314.26
BIC	392.03	360.47	421.72	394.73
log L	−159.88	−144.09	−150.63	−137.13

Standard errors in parentheses.

†Significant at $p<0.10$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.

Table created with R package apsrtable.

Table S3   Logistic regression coefficients of support for House Roll Call 84, congressional session 110.2. HR 5351: Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2008.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.35***	1.38***	2.88***	1.55***
	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.47)	(0.46)
≥1000 Auto workers	−0.15	−0.00	0.12	0.36
	(0.44)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.54)
Republican	−5.63***		−5.00***	
	(0.44)		(0.46)	
DW-NOMINATE		−7.12***		−6.75***
		(0.64)		(0.70)
Ford/Chrysler/GM PAC Contribs (log)			−0.14*	−0.16**
			(0.06)	(0.06)
AFL-CIO PAC Contribs (log)			0.16**	0.05
			(0.06)	(0.06)
N	417	417	417	417
AIC	189.74	150.82	181.75	147.36
BIC	238.14	199.21	262.41	228.02
log *L*	−82.87	−63.41	−70.87	−53.68

Standard errors in parentheses.
†Significant at $p<0.10$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.
Table created with R package apsrtable.

Table S4 Logistic regression coefficients of support for House Roll Call 233, congressional session 110.2. HR 5522: Worker Protection Against Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires Act of 2008.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	20.65	6.88***	20.28	4.68**
	(1183.32)	(1.62)	(1741.97)	(1.75)
≥1000 Auto workers	−0.28	0.43	−0.46	0.26
	(0.48)	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.67)
Republican	−22.57		−23.10	
	(1183.32)		(1741.97)	
DW-NOMINATE		−18.29***		−14.58***
		(3.72)		(3.70)
Ford/Chrysler/GM PAC Contribs (log)			0.01	0.01
			(0.07)	(0.08)
AFL-CIO PAC Contribs (log)			0.36***	0.17*
			(0.07)	(0.08)
N	411	411	411	411
AIC	141.12	91.33	112.17	90.61
BIC	189.35	139.55	192.54	170.98
log L	−58.56	−33.66	−36.09	−25.31

Standard errors in parentheses.

†Significant at p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table created with R package apsrtable.

Table S5 Logistic regression coefficients of support for House Roll Call 344, congressional session 110.2. HR 6049: Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	5.41***	4.38***	4.68***	5.15***
	(1.01)	(0.95)	(1.03)	(1.29)
≥1000 Auto workers	0.04	0.39	0.10	0.55
	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.47)
Republican	−6.94***		−6.37***	
	(1.02)		(1.03)	
DW-NOMINATE		−11.44***		−12.41***
		(1.95)		(2.43)
Ford/Chrysler/GM PAC Contribs (log)			−0.03	−0.05
			(0.05)	(0.06)
AFL-CIO PAC Contribs (log)			0.16**	−0.05
			(0.05)	(0.07)
N	422	422	422	422
AIC	201.98	147.35	197.36	149.84
BIC	250.52	195.89	278.27	230.74
log *L*	−88.99	−61.68	−78.68	−54.92

Standard errors in parentheses.
[†]Significant at $p<0.10$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.
Table created with R package apsrtable.

Table S6 Logistic regression coefficients of support for House Roll Call 458, congressional session 110.2. HR 2176: to provide for and Approve the Settlement of Certain Land Claims of the Bay Mills Indian Community.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	−0.33*	−0.94***	−0.79**	−1.32***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.26)	(0.22)
≥1000 Auto workers	0.10	0.06	0.01	−0.01
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Republican	−1.60***		−1.42***	
	(0.25)		(0.31)	
DW-NOMINATE		−1.51***		−1.30***
		(0.25)		(0.30)
Ford/Chrysler/GM PAC Contribs (log)			0.05	0.04
			(0.03)	(0.03)
AFL-CIO PAC Contribs (log)			0.07*	0.07*
			(0.03)	(0.03)
N	418	418	418	418
AIC	462.54	466.05	460.45	464.01
BIC	510.97	514.48	541.16	544.72
log *L*	−219.27	−221.02	−210.22	−212.01

Standard errors in parentheses.

[†]Significant at $p<0.10$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.

Table created with R package apsrtable.

Table S7   Logistic regression coefficients of support for House Roll Call 556, congressional session 110.2. HR 1338: Paycheck Fairness Act.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	22.58	5.13***	21.69	5.90**
	(1825.63)	(1.35)	(1751.10)	(1.86)
≥1000 Auto workers	−2.11*	−1.61	−2.26*	−1.58
	(1.05)	(1.03)	(1.08)	(1.08)
Republican	−24.71		−24.20	
	(1825.63)		(1751.10)	
DW-NOMINATE		−14.70***		−16.11***
		(3.03)		(3.86)
Ford/Chrysler/GM PAC Contribs (log)			−0.00	0.01
			(0.08)	(0.09)
AFL-CIO PAC Contribs (log)			0.21**	−0.07
			(0.08)	(0.10)
N	424	424	424	424
AIC	99.26	71.64	96.67	75.06
BIC	147.86	120.24	177.66	156.05
log *L*	−37.63	−23.82	−28.33	−17.53

Standard errors in parentheses.

[†]Significant at $p<0.10$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.

Table created with R package apsrtable.

Table S8 Logistic regression coefficients of support for House Roll Call 477, congressional session 111.1. HR 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.61***	−0.17	1.61***	−0.05
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.31)
≥1000 Auto workers	−0.19	−0.03	0.08	0.23
	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.43)
Republican	−4.60***		−4.48***	
	(0.40)		(0.43)	
DW-NOMINATE		−5.74***		−5.75***
		(0.53)		(0.56)
Ford/Chrysler/GM PAC Contribs (log)			−0.12**	−0.11**
			(0.04)	(0.04)
AFL-CIO PAC Contribs (log)			0.06	0.04
			(0.04)	(0.04)
N	430	430	430	430
AIC	305.27	253.12	298.44	249.73
BIC	354.03	301.89	379.72	331.00
log L	−140.63	−114.56	−129.22	−104.86

Standard errors in parentheses.

[†]Significant at $p<0.010$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$.

Table created with R package apsrtable.

3 Supplementary Figures

3.1 Robustness to alternative model specifications

To determine whether the estimates presented in our paper are robust to alternative model specifications, we regress votes on the bailout and cash for clunkers on many combinations of industry presence and PAC contributions. Figures 2–9 represent all non-intercept coefficients from these estimations.


Figure S2 Industry presence coefficient always positive in Bailout Vote logistic regressions. Coefficient densities with industry presence and DW-NOMINATE always included. Every combination of other variables included and excluded: contributions from Big 3 PAC, AFL-CIO PAC, AFIT-PAC, Auto Dealers PAC, Foreign Auto Dealers PAC, Auto Dealers and Drivers PAC, Transit Union Workers PAC. PAC contributions logged.

Each of the plot panels includes the density of the coefficient estimates from all 2^k possible logistic regressions including and excluding all k PAC variables we consider. The measure of industry presence in the district and either the member's DW-NOMINATE score or her partisanship are always included.

Most importantly, we note that the coefficient on industry presence for both the bailout and cash for clunkers votes is positive in every one of the 1020 unique specifications represented in the densities. The entire range of coefficient standard errors are listed in each panel's title.

Figure S3 Industry presence coefficient always positive in Bailout Vote logistic regressions. Coefficient densities with industry presence and DW-NOMINATE always included. Every combination of other variables included and excluded: contributions from Big 3 PAC, AFL-CIO PAC, AFIT-PAC, Auto Dealers PAC, Foreign Auto Dealers PAC, Auto Dealers and Drivers PAC, Transit Union Workers PAC. PAC contributions in dollars.

Figure S4 Industry presence coefficient always positive in Bailout Vote logistic regressions. Coefficient densities with industry presence and party always included. Every combination of other variables included and excluded: contributions from Big 3 PAC, AFL-CIO PAC, AFIT-PAC, Auto Dealers PAC, Foreign Auto Dealers PAC, Auto Dealers and Drivers PAC, Transit Union Workers PAC. PAC contributions logged.

Figure S5 Industry presence coefficient always positive in Bailout Vote logistic regressions. Coefficient densities with industry presence and party always included. Every combination of other variables included and excluded: contributions from Big 3 PAC, AFL-CIO PAC, AFIT-PAC, Auto Dealers PAC, Foreign Auto Dealers PAC, Auto Dealers and Drivers PAC, Transit Union Workers PAC. PAC contributions in dollars.

Figure S6 Industry presence coefficient always positive in Cash for Clunkers vote logistic regressions. Coefficient densities with industry presence and DW-NOMINATE always included. Every combination of other variables included and excluded: contributions from Big 3 PAC, AFL-CIO PAC, AFIT-PAC, Auto Dealers PAC, Foreign Auto Dealers PAC, Auto Dealers and Drivers PAC, Transit Union Workers PAC. PAC contributions logged.

Figure S7 Industry presence coefficient always positive in Cash for Clunkers vote logistic regressions. Coefficient densities with industry presence and DW-NOMINATE always included. Every combination of other variables included and excluded: contributions from Big 3 PAC, AFL-CIO PAC, AFIT-PAC, Auto Dealers PAC, Foreign Auto Dealers PAC, Auto Dealers and Drivers PAC, Transit Union Workers PAC. PAC contributions in dollars.

Figure S8 Industry presence coefficient always positive in Cash for Clunkers vote logistic regressions. Coefficient densities with industry presence and party always included. Every combination of other variables included and excluded: contributions from Big 3 PAC, AFL-CIO PAC, AFIT-PAC, Auto Dealers PAC, Foreign Auto Dealers PAC, Auto Dealers and Drivers PAC, Transit Union Workers PAC. PAC contributions logged.

Figure S9 Industry presence coefficient always positive in Cash for Clunkers vote logistic regressions. Coefficient densities with industry presence and party always included. Every combination of other variables included and excluded: contributions from Big 3 PAC, AFL-CIO PAC, AFIT-PAC, Auto Dealers PAC, Foreign Auto Dealers PAC, Auto Dealers and Drivers PAC, Transit Union Workers PAC. PAC contributions in dollars.

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